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The EU Global Strategy: from effective 
multilateralism to global governance that works? 
Balazs Ujvari 
Delivering effective global governance is 
amongst the five priorities of the European 
Union Global Strategy (EUGS). After its 
modest success in promoting its ‘effective 
multilateralism’ doctrine and rendering the 
world like itself, the European Union 
(EU)’s approach to global governance has 
now been somewhat overhauled. The 
Union remains idealist in promoting 
universal regimes with binding rules to be 
endorsed by the United Nations, but much 
more pragmatic in achieving this outcome. 
Effective multilateralism is now the end, 
not the means. 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
thought that a materialising ‘Brexit’ scenario 
would tempt the remaining 27 member states 
to go back to the drawing board and boost 
their joint ambitions, the High Representative 
opted to adhere to the initial timeline. 
 
The EUGS lists – perhaps for the first time in 
an EU foreign policy document – a number of 
core interests that all member states share. 
Building on the strategic assessment of the 
world presented by Mogherini to the 
European Council a year ago, the strategy also 
identifies five priority objectives to be pursued 
collectively by the 28 so as to secure their joint 
interests: (1) the security of the Union itself; 
(2) the stability of the EU’s neighbourhood; 
(3) addressing conflicts and crisis; (4) 
cooperative regional orders; and (5) effective 
global governance. This paper focuses on the 
fifth objective and assesses how the message 
of the EUGS on the international system 
differs from the ESS’s ‘effective 
multilateralism’ doctrine that, for many, has 
fallen short of being the guiding principle of 
international relations.    
 
BEYOND EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM 
As rule-based multilateralism remains deeply 
entrenched in the union’s DNA, the EUGS 
was not necessarily expected to represent 
groundbreaking innovations as to how the EU 
should act on the global scene. As Alyson 
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The European Union (EU)’s action on the 
international stage has been given a new 
impetus in the form of the European Union 
Global Strategy (EUGS). While uncertainties 
about the document long persisted, the EU’s 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, eventually 
presented the document on 29 June to the 
European Council – which EU leaders 
welcomed, also inviting the Commission and 
the Council of the EU to ‘take the work 
forward’. This comes right after the 
referendum of 23 June in the United Kingdom 
on the country’s membership of the EU, 
which resulted in the victory of the leave 
campaign (52%). While many may have 
thought that a materialising ‘Brexit’ scenario 
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Bailes pointed out, the EU’s ‘deepest interest 
lies in making others – and eventually the 
world – more like itself’.1 Indeed, the 28-
country bloc remains a multilateral entity par 
excellence – and this holds true in spite of a 
noticeable increase in intergovernmental 
tendencies characterising the EU in the wake 
of the 2008/2009 financial crisis.  
 
In this light, it is hardly surprising that the new 
strategy’s language – at first glance – resembles 
that of the ESS. The EUGS calls for a ‘global 
order based on international law’ centred upon 
the UN. It envisages the strengthening of 
multilateral processes where they already exist 
(trade, maritime security, marine resources 
etc.) and the expansion of fledgling 
international regimes in areas such as 
disarmament, arms control or international 
criminal law.  Furthermore, in promoting 
effective global governance primarily through 
the UN, the EU will seek to act in 
collaboration especially with its transatlantic 
partner, the United States, as well as with a 
number of regional organisations and like-
minded states in Asia, Africa and the 
Americas.  
 
Despite the above similarities, however, the 
EUGS sets out a much more elaborate vision 
of how the world should be governed than did 
the previous strategy. Rather than trying to 
define the way multilateral rules are created – 
as may have been the objective of the ESS 
through the effective multilateralism doctrine 
– the EUGS aims for an effective global 
governance system, leaving much more room 
for manoeuvre in how it is achieved. In other 
words, while striking deals through universal 
institutions certainly remains the EU’s 
preferred approach, the EUGS recognises that 
the format of effective global governance ‘may 
vary from case to case’ and the EU is best-
suited to act as a ‘co-ordinator’ of a plethora of 
multilateral processes. In brief, effective 
multilateral governance is now the end rather 
than the means. 
 BOTTOM-UP MULTILATERALISM 
More specifically, I argue that the EUGS’s 
message on global governance differs from 
that of the ESS in four respects. First, a 
notable difference concerns the EU’s approach 
to the traditional international financial 
institutions (IFIs), including the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In 
contrast to the ESS’s focus on the 
consolidation and extension of these bodies, 
the EUGS does not even seem to take their 
central role as given any more.  Unless they 
undergo structural reforms to better reflect the 
changed world order, suggests the strategy, 
they risk loosing their unique status as de facto 
agenda-shapers in their respective domains. 
This is an important recognition of the fact 
that, having grown disenchanted with the slow 
pace of reforms in traditional IFIs, emerging 
powers (led by China) have become more 
proactive than ever in seeking to boost their 
influence in international affairs. One key 
dimension of their rise manifests itself in the 
creation of parallel institutions such as the 
New Development Bank (NDB), the Asian 
Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) or 
the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). 
These structures, over which EU member 
states exercise limited or no influence, are all 
tailored to the needs and strategic interests of 
emerging powers and have indeed the potential 
of shaping the rules of the game in 
international policy making.  
 
Interestingly, the strategy presents ‘the 
emergence of alternative groupings’ as a 
necessarily detrimental development to EU 
member states. True, the latter are more likely 
to succeed in promoting their interests through 
traditional financial institutions – even if the 
price to pay is to compromise over a few seats 
or some voting power in favour of emerging 
powers. Given their overrepresentation in 
bodies like the IMF or the World Bank, EU 
countries are susceptible to retain a central role 
even if the cessation of a fragment of their 
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influence becomes inevitable. Yet, are we sure 
that the emergence of parallel structures is 
necessarily bad news for the EU? As things 
stand, the AIIB and the NDB, for example, 
appear to play a largely complementary role to 
the existing IFIs, presenting also the EU’s 
private sector with promising economic 
opportunities.2 Furthermore, turning a blind 
eye on the multilateral structures emanating 
from China and the like is at odds with the 
EU’s former calls on the emerging powers to 
undertake increased responsibilities on the 
international stage. As such, a choice between 
the continued reform of established structures 
and the embrace of new multilateral 
institutions is more complex than it may seem 
at first. The sub- and sectoral strategies that 
will result from the EUGS could therefore take 
a more nuanced approach towards these 
alternative groupings, including a case-by-case 
assessment of their impact on the EU’s 
interests. 
 
Second, instead of promoting rule-making in a 
top-down fashion through formal global 
institutions, the EUGS appears to open the 
door to doing so in a bottom-up manner – 
notably in the area of trade. This is a clear 
departure from the ESS’s emphasis on the 
WTO’s centrality and expansion (including 
China’s and Russia’s integration) to negotiating 
trade deals directly with key – groups of – 
countries. Clinching trade deals with priority 
partners such as the US, Japan, Mercosur, 
India or the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) is seen in the strategy as a 
building block towards revitalising the WTO as 
the epicentre of trade talks. Informed by the 
recognition that the EU’s ’prosperity hinges on 
an open and rules-based economic system’, the 
EUGS thus demonstrates that the EU’s 
approach to multilateralism can indeed be 
more flexible, giving more room to bi- or 
plurilateral arrangements with the aim of 
paving the way towards broader multilateral 
frameworks, as with the approval by the 
United Nations Security Council of the 
outcome of the E3/EU+3 negotiations with 
Iran. In other areas, too, the format of effective 
global governance, claims the document, will 
have to be determined on a case-by-case basis, 
involving, for instance, initial co-operation with 
the G20 on climate change and sustainable 
development, and with NATO and the 
ASEAN on maritime security.   
 
The third key difference concerns collaboration 
on the international stage. Departing from the 
ESS’s overwhelming emphasis on the United 
States, NATO and a handful of other regional 
organisations such as the ASEAN, 
MERCOSUR and the African Union, the 
EUGS goes much further. China, of course, 
has clearly gone from being a marginal point of 
reference in the ESS to receiving a much more 
substantial attention in the EUGS. This is 
mainly a recognition of Beijing’s increasingly 
central role in global commercial, climate and 
intellectual property considerations, among 
others. In addition, while the ESS only referred 
to Russia as a factor in the context of the 
Arab/Israeli conflict and the stability of the 
Balkans, the EUGS considers the country to be 
a challenger of the European security order. 
India also appears in the document as a 
strategic partner with which an ambitious free 
trade agreement is to be negotiated. However, 
despite these individual references to some of 
the key emerging powers of the 21st century, 
the strategy, surprisingly enough, omits to 
capture the increasingly institutionalised 
collaboration of the BRICS countries (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa) led by 
the goal of  shaping global governance – often 
to the detriment of the EU. After having been 
constrained to the release of joint declarations 
and the formulation of common positions on 
various international affairs, the BRICS co-
operation acquired institutional qualities with 
the establishment of the NDB in July 2014. 
This dynamic is expected to continue at the 8th 
BRICS summit in India next October that is 
hoped to result in the establishment of a 
BRICS credit rating agency and an India-based 
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  NDB institute to complement the work of the 
Shanghai-based multilateral. As such, the five-
country bloc’s commitment to boosting their 
political influence internationally through 
collective action appears to hold (despite their 
economic catch-up clearly loosing steam), which 
the EU member states should also closely 
monitor. 
 
Lastly, in addition to seeking to consolidate and 
expand multilateral mechanisms in areas where 
they already exist, the EUGS sets out the EU’s 
ambition to promote international rules and 
regimes in so far uncharted areas. Consequently, 
the EU will aspire to play a leading role in 
supporting the emergence of multilateral 
governance notably in areas like cyber security, 
digital economy, space or health.  
 
CONCLUSION: A SMARTER 
MULTILATERALISM? 
Shortly after the approval of the ESS of 2003, 
the feasibility of EU’s effective multilateralism 
doctrine was cast doubts upon.  For about a 
decade, arguments have been made in favour of 
rendering the EU’s approach to multilateralism 
more flexible, giving room to ad hoc coalitions, 
minilateral formats, strategic partnerships and 
transnational networks – in addition to formal 
institutions. To a large extent, the EUGS 
appears to cater for these calls. If adhered to, the 
strategy may allow the EU to decrease its 
overwhelming focus on binding global deals 
brokered through universal institutions as a 
necessary starting point for international 
arrangements. While policy-making via 
universal deals has endured in certain domains 
such as climate change, decision-making in 
other areas has often shifted to more limited 
platforms – a dynamic the EUGS correctly 
recognises. The EU’s future act on the 
international stage thus promises to be more 
flexible, where international institutions are not 
the point of departure for the resolution of an 
international challenge but rather the source of 
endorsement for a decision struck in a mini- or 
plurilateral context.   
 
While the EUGS may provide a new path for 
the EU’s approach to global governance, the 
strategy is, of course, not immaculate. Most 
importantly, it appears to turn a blind eye on 
the – potential – benefit side for the EU of the 
China-led shaping of the multilateral system as 
well as to the persisting dynamic of collective 
reformist action characterising the BRICS 
countries on the international stage. These 
shortcomings can, however, be redressed in 
the sub-strategies, policies and action into 
which the EUGS will be translated in the 
coming months – starting perhaps with a new 
EU strategy on Asia. 
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Endnotes 
1Bailes, A. (2009) ‘External Security Policies and the European Model’, In: Tsoukalis, L. (ed.), The EU in 
a World in Transition: Fit for what purpose?, Policy Network. 
 
2The NDB and the AIIB are exclusively dedicated to economic infrastructure projects, which only 
represent one of the many sectors in which most MDBs are involved. Such projects, for example, 
constituted only a third of the IBRD’s operations in 2012-2013. Furthermore, the European 
Commissions’ Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development devoted only 10% 
of its aid to economic infrastructure in 2013. 
 
  
